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Little changes have been introduced in the health care system of Ukraine 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a response to health care needs of 
protesters which could not be satisfied via state health care services, a number 
of organizations and groups of volunteers serve injured and sick protesters on 
the Euromaidan. This paper explores the organization and provision of 
medical care during the period of the Euromaidan: the role of organizations 
and groups of individuals who provided medical care on the Euromaidan, 
issues related to financing of medical care and related to ensuring safety in 
transportation, and treatment of injured protesters. In brief, medical care and 
relevant Euromaidan organizations can be grouped into three clusters: (a) 
actors of Ukrainian health care system which had functioned actively before, 
during and after the Euromaidan events (e.g. emergency medical care; private 
and state health care facilities); (b) individual volunteers and incident 
organizations which emerged during the Euromaidan (e.g. Medical Service of 
the Euromaidan—Medychna Sluzhba, Euromaidan SOS, Safety and Medical 
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Aid); and (c) organizations which had existed before but for the time of the 
Euromaidan their roles and functions shifted (e.g. churches, monasteries, Red 
Cross). By and large, enthusiasm of those who supported the Euromaidan 
and especially of volunteers contributed to a great extent to the number of 
saved lives; given this situation, the principles of the state health care system 
should be reconsidered. In the case of disasters when civil society cannot be 
mobilized rapidly, state medical care does not seem to prevent and minimize 
losses. Meanwhile, we can only infer how many lives could be saved if 
medical care of the whole Euromaidan, including state medical care and 
international support, has been coordinated properly with a focus on 
efficiency and political neutrality. The experience of medical care provision on 
the Euromaidan is invaluable regarding the organization of disaster 
management. 
Keywords: medical care; emergency care; disaster management; revolution; 




The Euromaidan protests have been the consequence of Ukrainians’ discontent with the 
corrupted regime of President Yanukovych. As the health care sector as well as other public 
services are deeply politicized, the protesters could not expect the necessary help from the state 
medical system which has been controlled by the government. In addition, public medical 
services are too archaic and non-effective because little change has occurred in medical care 
provision in Ukraine within the last decade. As a response to inadequate medical care provision 
in state facilities, the initiative to provide medical care for the Euromaidan by activists has arisen. 
In particular, several organizations have been established; there is also an essential contribution 
of volunteers and ordinary citizens who do not belong to any of these organizations.  
Smith and Dowell (2000) notice that incident organizations, which appear within a disaster, 
merge and direct “disparate resources drawn from many agencies” (p.1154)—e.g. “distributed 
people, technologies and procedures” in one disaster management system. However, the authors 
also emphasize that co-ordination between incident organizations is the most challenging aspect 
of a disaster management system. Still, a leader of the Euromaidan Medical Service during the 
protests, and currently Minister of Health, underlined that medical care provision on the 
Euromaidan is to be seen as “invaluable experience and invaluable achievements… highly ethical 
patient-physician relations, clear co-ordination of all actions as well as peer mutual medical care 
providers, high quality and scope of medical services for any and all patients … now lacking an 
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official Ukrainian medicine” (Ministry of Health, 2014). Apart from leaders’ opinions, a 
systematic and in-depth overview of medical care provision on the Euromaidan is needed. 
Therefore, this paper explores the organization and provision of medical care during the 
period of the Euromaidan (November 2013-February 2014). In particular, we investigate the 
number of organizations and groups of individuals who have provided health care services on 
the Euromaidan, their role, and other organizational peculiarities—for example, coordination, 
financing, provision and storage of health care goods, treatment and safety arrangements, etc. A 
case study method is used in this paper. Specifically, available web-resources are used for 
restoring the Euromaidan events which are related to the need in medical care as well as for 
identification of the key actors in medical care provision. Later, this information is also used for 
developing a guide for face-to-face interviews. Indeed, about a dozen of face-to-face interviews 
have been conducted with the Euromaidan and state medical care providers (leaders, volunteers) 
as well as with representatives of international organizations. The interviews have been aimed at 
revealing peculiarities of the organization of the Euromaidan medical care, its financing and co-
operation with other organizations, and inside coordination of the organization.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: this introductory section is followed by the 
overview of the Euromaidan chronology and then by a brief description of the specificity of the 
health care service provision in Ukraine. Data retrieved from the interviews are analyzed and 
presented in the section ‘Medical care on the Euromaidan’. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the key findings and lessons learnt.  
The Chronology of the Euromaidan1 
The Euromaidan started in 2013, on November 21 in Kyiv in the form of a peaceful civil 
society protest against President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to stop the country’s preparation 
to sign the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement. The document was supposed to 
further integrate Ukraine into the EU within the areas of freedom, justice, and security. The 
negotiation process had been conducted since 1999 and the signing was scheduled for 
November 29, 2013. On November 21, it became known to the public that Yanukovych 
suddenly refused Eurointegration in favor of closer economic relations with Russia. Overall, four 
phases of the Euromaidan can be identified. 
The first phase started on Novermber 21, 2013. One of the versions suggested that Mustafa 
Nayyem, a famous Ukrainian journalist, appealed to citizens via Facebook to organize a peaceful 
meeting on Kyiv central square Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in order to 
express their European choice. Nearly 1,000 people arrived at the square with Ukrainian and EU 
flags. Protesters demanded to restore Eurointegration of Ukraine and to sign the Agreement. 
                                                          
1 This section is based on the overview of web-sources on the Euromaidan events. The list of the sources 
used in this section is presented in Appendix 1. 
 






SHCS Journal Volume 1 No. 1, 2014: Contemporary Ukraine: A case of Euromaidan 
From November 21-29, 2013, a wave of mass meetings were organized in the capital, in several 
region centers of the country, as well as in other countries. In Kyiv, the number of participants 
was the largest—for example, more than 300,000 people took part in the walk to support the 
Agreement in Kyiv on November 24, 2013. Up until November 29, the protesters hoped that 
the President would consider public opinion and sign the document. Yanukovych attended the 
28-29 November EU summit in Vilnius, but the Association Agreement was not signed. It is 
worth mentioning that the first stage of the Euromaidan had similarities with the Orange 
revolution. Examples of similarities include the peaceful nature and bottom-up initiative used to 
rise against the obstruction of political decisions. 
Within the second phase of the Euromaidan, a peaceful meeting turned into clashes. Then, 
on the evening of November 29, 2013, a part of the protesters—mostly students—decided to 
spend the night on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti in order to demonstrate their disagreement with 
the President’s decision not to sign the Association Agreement. During the night of November 
30 around 4 a.m., when there remained approximately 400 people, the square was encircled by 
armed forces from a special battalion of riot police “Berkut,”with the order “to clean the place” 
of the protesters. During their attack on mostly sleeping people, these special police departments 
used packs of explosives, beat protesters (including women) with truncheons and feet, and threw 
them down on the ground. People, who were suspected of being protesters, were beaten within 
the radius of several hundred meters around the square. Until 4:30 a.m., that area was fully 
controlled by the “Berkut,” and the armed forces continued to pursue protesters into the nearest 
street, Khreshchatyk. The next day, the head of the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of Ukraine, Valeriy Koriak, announced that it was him who gave this order with regard to 
the necessity of putting Christmas trees on the square which was occupied by the protesters.  
As a result of police cruelty, there were up to a hundred injured protesters, as well some 
who disappeared without a trace. Those protesters who were scared and injured ran that night to 
the Mychailivskiy Cathedral which is situated near the Maidan Nezalezhnosti, and hid there. On 
the same day, representatives of the church gave an official statement where they denounced the 
use of violence against peaceful protesters and said that the church would provide them with 
shelter. Later, the dean explained that the police seized and arrested everyone who went out 
through the Cathedral gates. The buses with armed “Berkut” remained in front of the 
Mychailivskiy Cathedral.  
The fact that police brutality occurred became known to the public immediately, video 
proofs of police violence against peaceful protesters were available on the Internet. From the 
early morning of November 30, 2013 shocked citizens of Ukraine started to gather on the square 
near the Mychailivskiy Cathedral where beaten scared protesters remained. According to 
different estimations, nearly 40,000 people gathered on the square that evening. Using the 
Internet, especially social networks, calls were circulated to people asking them to gather on the 
streets in order to express protest against police violence.  
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On December 1, 2013, a mass peaceful demonstration took place in Kyiv, more than half a 
million came to the city center. Later that day, protesters occupied the House of Unions 
(Profspilka), Kiev City Hall, and the Maidan Nezalezhnosti where they set up their camp. From that 
moment, the political opposition parties, “Udar,” “Batkivshchyna,” and “Svoboda” attempted to 
manage the protest with different degrees of acceptance. The protesters stated that their meeting 
was non-political and that they did not support any political party, but supported the human 
rights, justice, and idea of Eurointegration. On December 1, a conflict took place between 
radical activists who tried to break into the President Administration building through police 
cordons. “Berkut” riot police violently dispersed them and arrested many activists, including 
journalists and doctors. Despite protesters’ demands to detect and punish those who were 
responsible for the conflict, the authorities kept ignoring peaceful meetings and continued to use 
force and intimidation.  
During December 2013, repressions by government forces and courts increased; the 
President’s parliamentary party “Party of Regions” also hired street hooligans (“titushki”) who 
were ordered to pursue and beat civil activists of the Euromaidan. This party also organized 
alternative protests—“AntiMaidan,” which was supposed to support the President’s decisions. 
The participants of the “AntiMaidan” were mostly paid for their demonstrations or forcibly 
brought from their places of work (controlled by authorities) upon threat of dismissal. On 
December 11, during the night, riot police Berkut attempted to disperse the unarmed protesters 
who remained on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti and tried to remove barricades built by the protesters. 
After this confrontation, many Euromaidan activists were injured. On December 25, journalist 
and civil activist Tetiana Chornovol who was famous by her anti-corruption investigation about 
Yanukovych’s vast property “Mezhygirya” was attacked and brutally beaten by three assaulters on 
the Kyiv-Boryspil road. Later, paper sheets with information about Chornovol’s care were found 
at the Mezhygirya security checkpoint. Other activists, Igor Lutsenko and Yury Verbytskyy, were 
kidnapped and tortured. Yury Verbytskyy was found dead in the woods; injured Igor Lutsenko 
managed to escape. Violence was Yanukovych’s strategy against the Euromaidan during the 
following several weeks. 
The third phase can be referred to increase of cruelty towards protesters. As Holt (2014) 
points out: “Initially largely peaceful, the protests, which began in November 2013, turned 
deadly in January this year after the sudden passage of controversial anti-demonstration laws” (p. 
588). Indeed, on January 15, 2014 Ukrainian courts banned protests and public assembly in Kiev. 
On January 16, 2014 the Communist party of Ukraine passed anti-protest laws, which 
criminalized peaceful meetings and other Euromaidan opposition methods. Protesters called 
January 16 “Black Thursday,” and claimed that “Ukraine Parliamentarianism [was] dead.” On 
January 19, 2014 protests erupted in Kyiv against “dictatorship laws.” In response to escalating 
violence, the police was permitted to increase measures in stopping protests, which included 
blocking roads into the city and using grenades and water cannons on protesters despite freezing 
air temperatures. Many protesters were severely wounded as a result of the actions of the police, 
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but the protest continued. January 21-22, 2014 three protesters were killed by the police, which 
used guns that time. On January 23, 2014 the police destroyed a Euromaidan medical center. 
Simultaneously, political opposition leaders negotiated with President Yanukovych on behalf of 
the protesters and on January 28, 2014 “dictatorship laws” were abolished. Nevertheless, those 
who were suspected to be participants of the Euromaidan protest were unjustly arrested and 
prosecuted. Yanukovych and his government used these methods as a means to stop the protest. 
Despite the danger of being severely injured and unjustly prosecuted, the protesters continued 
their movement and demanded presidential re-elections because of all the violations of human 
rights that he was responsible for.  
The fourth phase was the most violent time of the Euromaidan. On February 18, 2014 
nearly 20,000 protesters advanced on the Ukrainian parliament. The police attempted to stop 
them with flash grenades and tear gas and the protesters responded by throwing Molotov 
cocktails. At least 25 people were killed and over 1,000 injured. Violence continued for several 
days. On February 20, 2014 police special units shot at protesters with automatic guns and sniper 
rifles; they also targeted doctors and journalists. At least 75 people were killed. Since the 
beginning of the fourth phase, the opposition leaders attempted to reach armistice. An 
agreement to overcome the crisis was signed, though killings did not stop. On February 21, 2014 
it was known that members of the government and Yanukovych left Kyiv. On February 22, 2014 
the Parliament impeached Yanukovych due to his leaving Kyiv, and new presidential elections 
were scheduled for May 25, 2014. 
Health Care Services Within the Recent Socio-economic and Political Context of 
Ukraine 
After the collapse of Soviet Union, the overall situation in Ukraine was characterized by 
monopolization of political and economic power by political forces for self-enrichment as well as 
by lack of public trust in state institutions coupled with non-fulfillment of political and economic 
obligations (Kuzio, 2012). Although Ukrainian government attempted to improve public service 
provision, it did not meet real modernization and reforms; inefficiency, low quality, and high 
levels of corruption remain key features of the public service sector (Kuzio, 2012). One of the 
reasons for the lack of deep transformation process was seen in poor governance: the country 
indices of government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption were rather low (The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2012).  
Within the absence of clear goals, the transitional period resulted in an obsolete institutional 
base, in a crisis of public trust, as well as in a mixture of values (Berend, 2007; Gorobets, 2008). 
Still, considering the large territory and the population number in Ukraine, there was a great 
variability across the regions, especially between Western and Eastern parts of Ukraine. The 
prevalence of a nostalgic mood due to the loss of security was observed in Eastern regions, while 
in the Western part of Ukraine the intention to escape the communist past (e.g. joining EU) was 
more prevalent (Osipian & Osipian, 2012). Despite these general differences across the regions, 
 






SHCS Journal Volume 1 No. 1, 2014: Contemporary Ukraine: A case of Euromaidan 
‘self-help’ strategies became a common feature of public service consumption in the context of 
unfulfilled government promises (Polese et al., 2014). These ‘do-it-yourself’ policies (Cohen, 
2012) were also tolerated by the government with regard to fiscal weaknesses and inability to 
follow unpopular decisions. In particular, Ukraine showed a high level of life dissatisfaction as 
well as ‘extraordinary low levels’ of health satisfaction (as well as some other former Soviet 
Union republics) (Deaton, 2008). Ukraine was ranked 144th out of the 176 countries studied, 
tied with Cameroon and Syria (Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2013) 
and the most corrupted sectors were the police, the health service, and the education system.  
De jure, Ukrainian health care services are provided ‘free-of-charge’ as Article 49 of 
Constitution of Ukraine states; however, private expenditure is about 45% of total health 
expenditure, which is one of the highest shares in Europe (WHO, 2012). De facto, medical care is 
rather expensive for patients’ pockets; informal payments have become a barrier regarding access 
to health care services (Tambor et al., 2014). Lack of investments in health care services has 
resulted in out-of-date equipment, and shortages of health care goods, etc. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that about 80% of Ukrainians are not satisfied with medical care provided. A large 
portion of citizens prefer resorting to self-treatment strategies because of the unattractiveness of 
medical care (price, doctor’s attitude etc.), and few Ukrainians can afford using private health 
care services (Gorshenin Institute, 2011). Indeed, the private health care sector is still under-
developed in Ukraine, but in Kyiv, private medical facilities of different scale are more spread.  
Health care service provision in Ukraine is also characterized by the oversized hospital 
sector. Primary care is used only for minor complaints, while non-referral specialists’ visits have 
been typically obtained by patients for decades. There is also misbalance between poorly 
equipped ambulatories in rural areas and medical care provided in cities. Emergency medical care 
is mostly focused on ‘pre-admission care to patients and victims of accidents on-site and en 
route to the appropriate medical facilities… emergency care is provided at medical facilities along 
with other medical services’ (Lekhan et al., 2010, p.130). All medical providers (individual or 
institutionalized) are required to provide emergency care. Since the 1970s, aiming at improving 
quality of pre-admission emergency care, a specialization of medical teams has been offered (e.g. 
pediatric, psychiatric, cardiology etc.) as well as in the 1990s it still has been on the agenda of 
national programs; finally, the opposite effect has been noticed (Lekhan et al., 2010). A basic 
principle of emergency medical care (Skoraya in Russian or Shvydka in Ukrainian) in the Soviet 
Union is explained by Storey et al. (1971): ‘getting the doctor to the patient as quickly as possible 
with everything he needs in the way of equipment and personnel’. Coles (1984) and Komarov 
(1984) underline that abuse of ambulance services in non-emergency situations occurred because 
of low public awareness of reasons to call emergency care. ‘You call, we haul’ (Coles, 1984) 
principle remains currently in use; however, Shvydka is not properly equipped. As well, basic 
pharmaceuticals and medical goods are lacking because of financial and organizational restraints 
(Lekhan et al., 2010; Wright et al., 2000). Some ambulances are not even able to reach the patient 
because of lack of petrol or technical and mechanical difficulties. Chronic underfunding is also 
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marked on pre-hospital physicians’ official salary, which has been about $35-$65 per month. 
However, the providers ‘are enthusiastic about the care and services they provide’ (Wright et al., 
2000). Similar to other health care services, emergency medical care is to be provided free-of-
change, but in reality, patients or their relatives are expected to purchase any required health care 
goods (Wright et al., 2000) and to compensate physicians’ work. 
By and large, the nature of health care service provision presents a mixture of new 
transitory features (e.g. larger possibilities for informal incomes, importance of connections and 
bribes) and of features inherited from the Soviet Union (publicly financed and owned health care 
system, line-item budgets, hospital-centered, with low official salaries of medical personnel). 
Also, politicization as well as following the ruling ideology (as one of the communist regime 
features) continue to exist in post-Soviet period. Medical care providers, teachers, police as well 
as public servants are typically considered as important resources and channels of influence in 
political campaigns (Kuzio, 2012a; Osipian, 2010). Chief Doctors hold high positions not only in 
medical and social sectors, but also on the political arena, facility managers are seen as an 
important chain in the political patronage system under the context of poorly defined procedures 
(The World Bank, 2014). As such, health care workers should maintain their professional 
network, right connections, and be loyal to administration in order to acquire adequate 
promotion (The World Bank, 2014). The situation has not been changed, taking into account 
passive civil opposition (Berend, 2007; Gorobets, 2008) observed in previous years, while mass 
protests have also raised some parts of medical professionals. 
Medical Care on the Euromaidan 
Considering the peculiarities of Ukrainian health care services such as low accessibility, low 
quality, and inefficiency as mentioned above, the Euromaidan had its own system of medical 
service provision aimed at the health care needs of protesters. As presented in Table 1, about ten 
parties that had been involved in the organization and financing of medical care on the 
Euromaidan were identified. Overall, there were three main groups of the organizations:  
 
Table 1. Parties involved in medical care provision on Euromaidan (mentioned within the 
interviews)  
Main Roles and Functions 
Name of party/ 
organization 
Established on December 1, 2013. Provided pre-medical and 
medical care, conducted surgeries and other specialized medical 
interventions, searched for funding, organized stores of health care 
goods, ensured sanitary-epidemilogical control etc. 
Medical service of the 
Euromaidan, 
or Medychna sluzhba 
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Supported doctors-volunteers in all their work requests, searched 
for medications, allocated protesters to hospitals.  
People’s hospital, 
or Narodniy hospital’ 
Gathered and published information about urgent needs of 
protesters, e.g. medical treatment or safe transportation as well as 
other information.  
Euromaidan SOS 
Security during transportation (both organizations) as well as 
information about safe health care facilities; organization of 
treatment abroad. 




January 21, 2014 Security at the state hospitals (from kidnapping of the injured from 
there by military forces); preventing protesters patients from being 
arrested. 
Guard at the Hospital, 
Varta v likarni 
Pre-medical, paramedical and medical care on the Euromaidan; 
financing; providing medications and other resources. 
Independent volunteers 
who have not acted 
within existing 
organization  
Medical care, emergency medical care, treatment. 
People who have medical 
education, e.g. Medyky 
Maidanu 
Emergency medical care, safe treatment, free services, medications 
provision. 
Private health care 
facilities 
Attempted to control the situation by the authorities, gathered 
medical statistics at state hospitals; not clear role in providing 
medical care on the Maidan. 
Ministry of health and  
state health care facilities 
and services 
Trainings for volunteers, Medical care in the field, medications and 
supply materials provision. 
International 
organizations,  
e.g. Red cross 
Provision of save environment for protesters’ hospital and lodging. Churches 
Authors suppose that there were more organization, however the paper just explores the 
organizations, therefore, next studies could be focused on completing the list of organizations 
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 (a) actors of Ukrainian health care system which had functioned actively before, 
during, and after the Euromaidan events (e.g. emergency medical care; private and state 
health care facilities);  
(b) individual volunteers and incident organizations which had emerged during the 
Euromaidan (e.g. Medical Service of Euromaidan – Medychna sluzhba, Euromaidan SOS);  
(c) organizations which had existed before but during the time of the Euromaidan 
their roles and functions were shifted (e.g. churches, Red Cross).  
More detailed description of these organizations’ activities is provided in the next sub-
sections. 
Medical organizations of the Euromaidan and their roles. The first medical 
organization and perhaps the most visible one emerged between November 30 and December 1, 
2013. The Medical Service of National Resistance Headquarter also known as Medychna sluzhba of 
the Euromaidan was initiated by opposition political parties and founded by several medical 
doctors. They were experienced in the organization of health care service provision at state 
facilities and in medical care provision during the Orange revolution in 2004. Medychna sluzhba 
established the first medical care points when the first traumas occurred on the Euromaidan. By 
and large, the Euromaidan medical points were seen as health care units, representatives of 
political parties, involved in the Euromaidan. Thus, political opposition to the regime of 
Yanukovych (Svoboda and Bat’kivshina) had been represented on the Euromaidan in the medical 
sector. Still, medical care of the Euromaidan did not seem to be perceived as politically 
influenced care as there was evidence of serving titushki and other pro-Yanukovych forces. 
Medical care points were organized in the building of Trade union (Profspilka) as it had been 
previously done within the Orange revolution. Later, medical points were established in Kyiv city 
state administration (KMDA) and the October palace (Zhovtneviy palats). The aim of Medychna 
sluzhba was to establish and coordinate institutionalized medical care on the Euromaidan. Based 
on one of the participant’s opinions, regarding large crowds and cold weather conditions, 
medical care was mostly focused on the treatment of pneumonia (as there were people who just 
slept on cardboard on the stairs in the hall of the building), hypertensive crisis, and heart attack 
etc., and nobody expected massive violence. Considering inconsistency of the qualitative data 
obtained via face-to-face interviews with Maidan medical service organizers, there were several 
more versions of the nature of medical care provided: “we predicted that a lot of clashes would 
take place on Maidan after the first slaughter, therefore, we selected doctors, not only general 
physicians, but also those who specialized in surgery, trauma” (coordinator of Medical service).  
After January 16-17, the first non-medical mobile teams patrolled Maidan in order to 
identify protesters who needed medical care (sick, injured, wounded). Volunteers took in patients 
at the medical point where the first medical aid was organized. Hospital beds were organized in 
the churches as it was rather dangerous to bring patients to the state hospitals. Also, state and 
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private health care facilities provided specialized care to the severely sick and injured protesters. 
Even more organizations were launched as a result of the bottom-up principle and as a response 
to new safety challenges. For example, when safety of the patient as well as treatment became an 
issue to be solved, “Guard at the hospital” (Varta v likarni) and “Safety and Medical Aid” 
(Bezpechne transportuvannia) organizations appeared on the arena (the latter organization is 
described below). 
Red Cross played an important role since they “took the most complicated patients and 
drew out people under the hail of lead bullets” (coordinator of Medychna sluzhba). Other bottom-
up initiatives such as Medyky Maidanu, Maidan emergency care, Euromaidan SOS, 
MedAutoMaidan, and Narodniy hospital contributed to in-time medical care service provision on 
the Euromaidan, as well.  
Considering the unwillingness of Shvydka’s teams to come on the Maidan as well as the 
urgency of the cases, there were agreements between coordinators of Medychna sluzhba and 
Shvydka—ambulance care was on duty on the Euromaidan: “when we saw that hospitalization 
was required, we called 103 [Shvydka], they called the ambulance-on-duty, and thus we saved time 
in such a way” (coordinator of Medical service). In principle, Shvydka was not able to deny the 
call but the reason for not reaching the point of destination (e.g. barricades) could be given as 
the explanation for not coming. One of the protesters that was interviewed described the 
following situation: 
A typical ambulance team – a very old doctor of 100+ years and the same age nurse – they 
are not really motivated to work, but if they really want to, they are not able to provide care 
with regard to physical abilities of elderly people. Therefore, all ambulances, teams who 
tried not to reach the Maidan, have found a million reasons for this. It is impossible to opt 
out the call, but find 150 reasons for not coming – yes. (Doctor of Shvydka) 
The Maidan Medical service organization aimed to provide all possible care within its 
departments. There was also a surgery department: “It was a very fine operation room at 
Profspilka. State hospitals even did not have such places, only huge private facilities could allow 
that level of expenditures: very modern equipment, all necessary instruments, medicaments... but 
there were very few people who knew how to use that equipment and medical goods correctly” 
(emergency care provider). Still, the service capacities of Medychna sluzhba were limited, so they 
could not serve all patients, especially those who needed hospitalization. Such patients were 
transported to the hospitals by Shvydka or by volunteers. Interestingly, medical teams of 
ambulance reported on unnecessary use of the ambulance: “Near Profspilka there was a crew on 
duty. If someone came up with a finger broken, the person had to be taken to the emergency 
department of health care facility. At the same time, someone with a severe injury, e.g. with a 
fractured skull, could miss that car as it had just left. In the meantime, a new one arrived in a half 
hour and the person with severe trauma died… and it was not a case of February 18-20…” 
(Doctor of Shvydka). Indeed, as it was mentioned above, the awareness about using medical care 
 






SHCS Journal Volume 1 No. 1, 2014: Contemporary Ukraine: A case of Euromaidan 
resources is generally low: “The public does not know when the ambulance care could be used 
and when patients could reach the medical facility by themselves” (medical provider). 
In contrast to state medical care, private health care facilities offered free-of-charge services 
for protesters, including ambulances on the Maidan. Lacking adequate and safe state care as well 
as lack of funds, an essential care (e.g. dental, ophthalmological care) was provided by private 
facilities, as well.  
Furthermore, taking into account a large in-kind food contribution from people to 
protesters, Medychna sluzhba of the Euromaidan launched the Sanitary-epidemiological service. As 
the model of Ukrainian health care system predisposes, a sanitary-epidemiological service 
conducted disinfection of floors occupied by protesters. The possibility of mass showering was 
organized as well as safety and the control of food were ensured: kitchen volunteers had masks, 
hats, and gloves. In particular, there were about 27 sanitary-epidemiological teams which 
consisted of one medical doctor and two nurses; also, medical students were actively involved in 
this work. The teams carried out control disease detection. They worked at the dining room, in 
the areas where people had a rest and in other places. At the end of the shift, teams prepared and 
submitted reports to the coordinator. The reports included a list of issues related to food, 
sanitary conditions of the tents, of the floor, or certain areas. As a result, no mass food poisoning 
and no other epidemic occurred during the Euromaidan.  
Medical service of the Euromaidan also had a system of shifts and reports, a traditional 
practice for state medical facilities: ‘Our administrative experience in health care helped a lot: 
“the duty is passed – the duty is accepted” system, filling in medical forms, and morning, evening 
rounds. It was necessary to monitor all medical points—if there were doctors, what is the 
condition of the medical point and other issues’ (coordinator of Medychna sluzhba).  
Additionally, the Medical service was surrounded by other supportive organizations. In 
particular, a great job had been done by psychologists as “in the moments of overstrain it was too much 
for human brains” (coordinator of Medical service).  
Coordination of medical care on the Euromaidan. Medical service of the Euromaidan 
operated with many volunteers who were willing to support the revolution and to help 
protesters. First of all, some health care personnel from state and private facilities came on the 
Euromaidan as volunteers during their out of work time. Also, people with medical education 
but without recent medical practice had also joined medical care teams, as well as volunteers 
without medical education. For different groups of volunteers, training sessions on pre-medical 
care were scheduled (e.g. by Red Cross).  
In the beginning of the Maidan, Medychna sluzhba asked volunteers to show copies of 
medical diplomas and attempted to check where the person worked. The lists of medical doctors 
were compiled—which doctors were ready to work on the Maidan, their phone numbers, and 
other details. In calm periods, coordinators of the Medical Service contacted them and prepared 
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a schedule of their work. During the shift, about three-four physicians, the same number of 
nurses, volunteers and surgeon, and sometimes anesthesiologist did their work. Volunteers who 
confirmed their medical profession were invited to the Medical sluzhba first. Still, as the Medical 
service coordinator noticed: “We could not check all volunteers but in 50 minutes of medical 
care provision, it was easy to see whether it was professional doctor or not. People often said 
directly that they did not have medical education, but they were ready to assist doctors, for 
example, to carry on patients” (coordinator of Med-sluzhba). Meanwhile, a lot of volunteers who 
were not attached to any of the institutionalized medical points also provided medical care for 
protesters.  
The role of state health care services was minor. Most state administration representatives 
as well as civil servants aimed to avoid any decisions, and therefore, responsibility. As one of 
coordinators of the Medychna sluzhba noticed: “Even the Health Officer of the city—they all 
showed the white feather. The Ministry of Emergency Situations did the same. I called them and 
asked a simple question: People came out to defend their rights, they do not want to go - give 
them means for normal life on the Maidan, give them tents, take care of heating. They told me: 
we have only one tent for 12 people and that is all. Only in 2 months, we signed an agreement 
with disinfection service. The agreement was on medical service of the Maidan, which situation 
we controlled.” 
It was impossible to plan the work of medical care provision on the Euromaidan, since 
Berkut’s attacks and provocations of titushki were unexpected events. There were peaks of activity 
- slaughters and periods of recessions, when the situation became calmer. All interviewees 
indicated that the most unpredictably difficult day was February 18, 2014. Ttherefore, the 
Maidan faced more challenges related to the organization of medical and emergency care.  
In such a context, theMedychna sluzhba of the Maidan introduced 24-hour shifts. However, 
they did not have enough medical doctors to provide emergency care: “I am called by 
coordinator on 18 of February: ‘there is slaughter, come here, there is none to sew people’. I was 
the only surgeon at that time. Later more surgeons came. That night the Profspilka building 
burned and we had to move into the Mikhailivskiy Cathedral and the KMDA. On February 19, 
we had already instruments for surgery, it was a bit calmer and we could safely sew 20 people 
immediately in different place” (Maidan surgeon). Therefore, a lot of medical doctors worked 
more than 24 hours that time on the Maidan. Moreover, medical doctors-volunteers did not have 
recent experience in such injuries; therefore, the experience of surgeons who worked in the 
world’s hot places was invaluable: “When Vasyl—a professional surgeon who worked in Iraq—
came, everything went smoother. He conducted a lot of surgeries in February and later” 
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Box 1. Experience of both Maidan medical volunteer and physician of Shvydka 
I came with my friend on the Maidan in one of the evenings of December 2013. When we had 
free time, when we were willing to help, then we put on an ‘emergency care’ vest and walked out with a 
backpack on the Maidan. We provided care, treatment, pharmaceuticals to everyone who needed. When 
my personal medical storage was over, I visited the Medychna sluzhba in order to take medicines. I just 
came and said: I am a medical doctor, I need medicaments. The reply: here is the storage room, take everything you 
need. They were very happy to have more volunteers with medical education as the majority of 
volunteers did not have health care background. Still, I was provided with about 10 non-medic 
volunteers; among them there were several people who participated in my trainings on pre-medical 
care. Volunteers walked by and carried bags; they were not very helpful in medical care but yes, it was 
the time when they could learn a lot of things. 
We treated people with different health problems: there were a lot cases of alcoholic epilepsy, 
many injuries were related to alcohol. Intestinal infections (people did not wash hands before eating, 
not all food passed through the kitchen and therefore did not pass through the control system), acute 
conditions of chronic diseases, sinusitis, pneumonia, bronchitis and others for this season. Crowded 
conditions for disease were there. Still, the hardest work was conducted on February 18. February 20 
was also a hard day but after midday, doctors had not a lot of work, because of the professionalism of 
snipers who shot protesters (as well as volunteers) directly in their heads.  
Meanwhile, pharmaceuticals and medical supplies were available on the Shvydka during the 
Euromaidan as some untouched reserves were used. The most popular goods were bandages, special 
napkins in case of bleeding; we were lacking tourniquets and gloves. Formally, the Shvydka’s doctors are 
provided with all necessary goods, however, in practice, we are lacking a lot of things. Most 
interestingly, that according to the law, a doctor is not entitled to bring health care goods from outside, 
but how can you provide first medical aid if the patient is bleeding and you do not have gloves? 
Therefore, doctors of the Shvydka break the law each time. It appears that life costs a penny (e.g. gloves 
and basic medicines) and the state does not understand this. If the patient dies because of being 
unequipped Shvydka, it stays on your conscience you are legally responsible for this death, and you are 
not asked why dropper or something else have not been bought (because everything is there according 
to the documents). You sign the document each day before the shift and if you do not sign you are not 
allowed to work. 
Surely, we buy gloves and other items. During the Maidan, when we brought the patient to the 
hospital, there were a lot of volunteers from whom we ‘borrowed without return’ as well. After the 
Maidan events, ambulance cars do not have literally nothing and in order to provide a minimal care 
doctors buy the most essential staff from their own pockets. Even more, all the Shvydka cars are in the 
holes after the Maidan shooting. 
Acting either as medical doctor volunteers or as state emergency, I was treated by others on the 
Maidan also differently: when you are in the vest of state emergency care, then you are treated like a 
third-rate doctor and no one is listening to your advice, but if you are a volunteer of the Maidan, you 
are a hero.  
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Overall, the emergency care during February 18-20 was not coordinated properly. First of 
all, the traditional sorting process did not occur during the situation of mass trauma. In 
particular, the first team which arrived in the place for mass injuries had to sort patients as 
formal procedures describe. It was necessary to sort patients based on their condition and 
specificity of the trauma. Consequently, the next ambulance teams could not bring patients of a 
certain injury to the specialized medical centers: a more efficient approach predisposed 
transporting patients with eye trauma to ophthalmological centers in one car. Still, the ambulance 
car was full with patients of a variety of traumas and the car had to travel from one center to 
several more centers. As an emergency medical care provider reported:  
When there was fighting, it was complete chaos and mess. Someone was wounded, he was 
taken from the crowd and carried anywhere, for example to the Profspilka building. If the 
patient was in difficult condition, then they called the ambulance. By the way, when it was 
burned, no one knew about it. There was a lot of smoke, but no one had an idea that it was 
fire. I remember that I went on the 5th floor, it was a lot of smoke and I could not 
understand why it was so warm there. But, when the ambulance left, we realized that it was 
fire… there were a lot of people who stayed there lying … there was a real chaos… 
(emergency medical care provider) 
At the same time, the administration of the Shvydka gave up and put all possible 
responsibility on the shoulders of the medical doctors. In contrast to typical practice, emergency 
care providers had to make clinical decisions by themselves without immediately reporting to the 
senior doctor. Also, emergency care teams had to contact medical facilities by themselves in 
order to check the possibility of patients’ admissions. However, some ambulances came from the 
Kyiv district and region; some ambulances were given as in-kind gifts from international partners 
and organizations to the Medychna sluzhba. 
To summarize, a lot of enthusiastic people came and supported the Euromaidan: there were 
inexperienced volunteers as well as professionals (e.g. managers of pharmacies, health care 
facility administrators). However, there was no single coordination body present: “people helped 
a lot, but there was no coordination between physicians, between organizations on the Maidan 
and therefore a quick response to the disaster was not available. All coordinators were afraid of 
responsibility… as it is everywhere—two Ukrainians, three bosses. All volunteers did something 
and it was a mess. In calmer periods, we had some time to stop and to think… but not during 
clashes…” (medical care provider). 
Ensuring the needs of the Euromaidan medical care. All medical care provision was 
largely supported by Ukrainian public, businessmen, international organizations, and other 
countries. We noticed several components of the system of medical care provision on the 
Euromaidan. First of all, direct cash charitable contributions were given to protesters (doctors 
and other volunteers who provided care). Concerning the activities of the Medychna sluzhba, they 
received financial resources through three main flows. There was a separate box for donations 
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which was placed at visible places in the Medychna sluzhba temporary office. Then, a cashless 
account was offered for donations, but it was blocked in three weeks. Later, coordinators’ and 
volunteers’ personal bank cards were used as a substitution for the previous bank account—
people could transfer funds there. Finally, volunteers could donate money in the National 
Resistance Staff office, and the Medychna sluzhba also required necessary sums from there 
according to the needs presented in the application forms. Raised funds were used to purchase 
certain types of medicines, and to rent accommodations for medical volunteers from other cities 
(as they could not be present on the Maidan 24 hours per day).  
Not only monetary, but a variety of other resources—human, in-kind goods (food, 
pharmaceuticals, clothes etc.) as well as social networks and professionalism—had been provided 
by those who supported the Euromaidan. For example, organizations and individual volunteers 
shared the lists of necessary goods, which were ‘bought and brought’ (Arsenijevic, 2012) by a 
supportive public. People also contacted coordinators of the Medical service directly in order to 
get the list of necessary medicine, including rare and strong drugs. Also, social networks of 
volunteers made it possible to influence the decision-making (related to the treatment and other 
areas) process of national and international bodies. 
Announcements of necessary pharmaceuticals and medical supplies resulted in significant 
amounts of health care goods available on the Maidan. Large quantities of goods required 
storage (there were several places, one of the storage locations was also located in the Profspilka) 
and corresponding to it a system of sorting, saving, and delivery. Thus, management of health 
care goods was one of the key tasks of the Medychna sluzhba. However, the capacities of the 
organization were limited in this area. There were numerous cases when people or drivers of cars 
that were filled with drugs could not find a responsible person to provide protesters with the 
drugs; after several hours of waiting, they left medical points.  
Medical points had to apply to receive necessary health care goods via written requests, 
Medical doctors (volunteers) reported on easy access (without any documents and application) to 
medicines: “When I could not afford buying medicines, I just came and said: ‘I am a medical 
doctor, I need medicaments’. They replied: ‘here is the storage room, take everything you need” 
(quotation from the story of a health care provider who acted as a volunteer on the Maidan as 
well as was employed at the Shvydka which is presented in Box 1). However, it was a common 
situation that some resources were excessive and other goods were lacking. Sometimes, one 
resource (e.g. specific medication) was in excess at one place (hospital or medical point) and 
lacking in a nearby one. Or, it was in need one day and overly excessive the following day, after 
the need was publicly announced.        
Safe Transportation and Safe Treatment on the Euromaidan 
In January 2014, Ukrainian political context and prosecution of protesters created new 
challenges (apart from medical care provision) for the Euromaidan patients and organizers of 
medical care. The appearance and specificity of traumas identified the person from the 
 






SHCS Journal Volume 1 No. 1, 2014: Contemporary Ukraine: A case of Euromaidan 
Euromaidan, making his or her relocation rather dangerous: “those who left Maidan were 
immediately ‘packed’ by Berkut, police” (coordinator of Medical service). Patients could not refer 
to state health care facilities, taking into account the risk of being taken by the police from the 
hospitals. Also, before referring a patient to emergency care and state hospital, the Euromaidan 
Medical service collected information on the degree of safety of the state or private health care 
facility, department, and medical doctors. Overall, the problems of safety were tackled by several 
organizations with the focus on providing patients with safe transportation to the health care 
facilities (e.g. AvtoMaidan and Bezpechne transportuvannia) and safe treatment in the state hospital 
(e.g. Varta v likarni), including searching possibilities of treatment abroad (e.g. Bezpechne 
transportuvannia). 
The Medychna sluzhba acting as the primary medical center and referral center arranged 
cooperation with ulterior hospitals, as there were no other options to treat patients. For example, 
in case of barotrauma caused by a flashbang grenade, the first medical aid was delivered on the 
Maidan. The person stayed about half an hour at one of the medical points and then 
transportation was required. Some state health care providers agreed to keep patients in the 
hospitals without declaring them to the police. Mainly, the chief doctor was the key person who 
could (not) support the Maidan and therefore was (not) able to provide a safe environment for 
the treatment. For example, hospital #18 near Shevchenko University and hospital #12 accepted 
injured patients, but Emergency care hospital (Likarnia shvidkoi dopomogy) declared all the Maidan 
patients to police. Therefore, it was very dangerous to bring protesters there.  
The case of safety and medical aid (Bezpechne transportuvannia). “Safety and 
Medical Aid” was the first and the largest volunteer service, which evacuated wounded and ill 
Maidan activists to safe locations. On these locations, patients were provided professional 
medical assistance. The initiative to provide safe medical assistance to activists was founded by 
three volunteers (none of whom had any political party affiliation) at the end of January 2014. 
Since the moment of its foundation and until the victory of the Maidan, “Safety and Medical 
Aid" remained an ulterior organization, which included up to 60 volunteer activists. 
The initiative emerged as a solution to the failure of state hospitals to provide basic services 
despite the fact that they were responsible for medical treatment and its safety. Consequently, 
wounded activists were not provided with proper medical aid in hospitals. Moreover, hospitals 
turned into traps which would most likely lead to criminal charges and consequent imprisonment 
of the Maidan activists for up to 15 years (apart from other villainy committed to the Maidan 
activists by representatives of the law enforcement authorities of Ukraine). In particular, some 
physicians were instructed on how to act in the case of the Maidan patient: they had guidelines 
explaining what to do with patients of typical appearance (smell of smoke, extra warm (dirty) 
clothes, quilted coats etc.) and with typical health problems (pneumonia, rubber bullet shots, 
head injuries etc.). In response to such situations, the idea of ‘safe transportation’ initially was 
aimed at ‘liberation’, saving in-patients from police departments. Later, the organization 
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provided a safe alternative for state treatment of hospitalized Maidan activists. However, 
hospitals were crowded with police and Berkut. Therefore, the rescue of wounded activists was 
very risky for activists and volunteers. First, it was decided to focus the organization’s activities 
on intercepting activists before they got into hospitals.  
Concerning the organization, there were no official leaders, but a collective coordination of 
group work was present. The “Safety and Medical Aid” kept records of all its activities as well as 
a registration form for the volunteers was required in advance when they signed up for a duty. 
Volunteers were asked to work in groups of two people or more, but usually they worked in 
groups of 3-4 people. 
The structure of the “Safety and Medical Aid” organization was composed of five main 
groups:  
a) volunteers of call-center, who coordinated actions of the other groups of volunteers, 
serving as a linkage between them and as an info-center 
b) volunteers of the ’field’ (i.e. at Independence square) evacuated ill and injured people 
from the Maidan and disseminated information about the initiative “Safety and 
Medical Aid” at the Maidan (especially among medics) 
c) drivers transported of wounded activist and volunteers 
d) volunteers at locations, were responsible for hosting in-patients (they met injured 
people, explained basic details of staying on the location etc.) as well as for 
coordinating actions with the Maidan and other Safety and Medical Aid volunteers 
e) medical doctors who provided medical assistance to activists and, when necessary, 
consulted other volunteers concerning medical issues (for example, to decide whether 
to bring an activist to location or to public hospital)   
The team of the “Safety and Medical Aid” was formed only via personal contacts in order 
to ensure trust between activists and to ensure the ulterior nature of the organization.   
Safe transportation and medical assistance mechanisms were as follows: ‘Field’ volunteers 
checked at medical stations whether there was someone to be ‘evacuated’. Sometimes Maidan 
medics themselves called to volunteers and asked for transportation of the activist. ‘Field’ 
volunteers verified the physical condition and veracity of the activists’ complaints (often under 
coordination of the Safety and Medical Aid medical doctor) and asked for brief personal 
information (how long he has stayed at the Maidan, where the activist is from, how the accident 
happened etc.). Each case was recorded. Meanwhile, volunteers of call-centers organized 
transportation, medical support, and locations for activists. Patients were accompanied by the 
field volunteers to safe locations or to the ‘reliable’ medical doctors at the state hospitals. 
Severely injured or very sick activists who needed surgery or complicated specific treatment were 
not taken to locations but only to state hospitals where safety was not guaranteed. 
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Churches and monasteries also served as locations. The “Safety and Medical Aid” 
organization collaborated with a number of churches of different denominations, where ulterior 
hospitals were organized during the protests. Patients with relatively simple problems e.g. 
pneumonia, acute colds, head injuries etc., were transported to the locations, where they were 
provided with beds, medicines, and medical treatment. More severe medical care was provided at 
the underground locations during the fourth phase of the protests, but no complicated surgeries 
were done there. Preparing for the dispersal of the Maidan, the “Safety and Medical Aid” 
volunteers organized three more ulterior hospitals (two of them were churches).  However, extra 
locations almost were not used because severely wounded patients were transported to hospitals. 
Whereas, the rest of injured protesters were largely hosted by Kyiv citizens. Apart from the 
ulterior hospitals or ‘locations’, the “Safety and Medical Aid” had its network of medical doctors, 
usually of narrow specialization, who provided medical care in hospitals. This network of 
doctors was formed via personal contacts of the “Safety and Medical Aid” volunteers, the 
EuromaidanSOS, or hotline of Olga Bogomolets. 
The “Safety and Medical Aid” cooperated with medical organizations of the Maidan: 
Medical Service of Maidan, medical point at KMDA, October Palace, Ukrainian House, Officer 
House, Central Postal Office, and others. Its telephone numbers were distributed among medical 
points at the Maidan and local leaders of the Maidan activists (sotnyk). The majority of calls were 
received from the Medical Service of the Maidan at the Profslipka. The “Safety and Medical Aid” 
also cooperated with the EuromaidanSOS, providing each other information about the needs of 
the Maidan, warnings, etc. The organization launched cooperation with the Fund of Ukrainian 
Medical Doctors from Chicago ‘Medical Help for Protesters at Maidan in Kyiv, Ukraine 
International’. About 120,000 UDS of the Funds’ financial aid was distributed among wounded 
Maidan activists by some of the ‘field’ volunteers of the “Safety and Medical Aid.” It was a 
selective financial assistance where each payment was documented and supported with reports 
and photos. Among other organizations, the “Safety and Medical Aid” worked with Varta v 
Likarni, AutoMaidan, Autodozor, Fund of Olga Bogomolets, Hungarian Aid etc. 
In February 2014, the “Safety and Medical Aid” started to cooperate with official 
representatives of other countries concerning medical treatment of severely wounded Maidan 
activists abroad. The initiative came from both sides. Medical treatment abroad was a good 
opportunity for protesters with severe wounds because it stipulated free, safe, and quality 
medical treatment, some of which could not have even be provided in Ukraine (e.g. specific 
prosthesis). Before the victory of the Maidan, the “Safety and Medical Aid” sent about 20 
activists to Poland for medical treatment, though that activity was considered illegal at that time.    
After the victory of the Maidan, the “Safety and Medical Aid” team gradually shifted its 
activity towards the organization of medical treatment and transportation for severely wounded 
activists abroad, and the composition of the database of injured Maidan activists. During 
February-March 2014, about 150 injured activists were sent by the “Safety and Medical Aid” to 
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Poland, Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Israel, and Italy. Germany sent its unique 
military plane equipped with an operating room. They took activists in critical conditions who 
needed medical treatment that could not have been provided in Ukraine. One of the activists was 
operated directly on the plane.  
Safe transportation and medical aid to wounded protesters had lost its relevance in the 
meanwhile. Nevertheless, the activists of the “Safety and Medical Aid” continue working and 
adjusting their activities to the needs of society. From the group of highly organized volunteers, 
the “Safety and Medical Aid” has turned into an institutionalized SCO “Initiative E+,” which 
continues the formation of a single complete database of the injured Maidan activists and the 
provision of various types of assistance to Maidan activists. Data from the database (currently it 
accounts over 560 cases) is used by the Commission for Investigation of Human Rights Abuses 
in Ukraine as a supplement in a collective lawsuit against the former Ukrainian government filed 
with the Hague Tribunal. Medics arrange medical treatment for those activists who still require it 
(mostly eye and limb prosthetics), whereas lawyers help activists and relatives of deceased 
activists with paperwork for the public prosecutor's office etc. Finally, the “Safety and Medical 
Aid’ team applies its experience at the Maidan with the work of the ATO, providing assistance 
for injured soldiers.  
Discussion 
The experience of medical care provision during the Euromaidan is worth deriving lessons 
from for the future in order to underline the most efficient responses to disasters, as well as to 
improve some areas which have not been within the focus of decision-makers and leaders of the 
Euromaidan.  
Importantly, the Euromaidan has demonstrated a different nature of the phenomenon of 
disaster, though it has been rooted in the Orange revolution of 2004. This statement is also 
relevant for the organization of medical services. Similarly to 2004, the central body for medical 
care, Medychna Sluzhba, has been established. However, during the events of 2013-2014 it has 
appeared that organizational capacities are not enough to deal with new challenges, which have 
led to triggering the emersion of new organizations, processes, and resources.    
One of the notable unique features of the Euromaidan is the connection between medical 
care and politics. A highly centralized, government-driven state system of medical care showed 
its weakness when it was used as a tool for exercising force towards protesters. In fact, 
government, together with its medical branch, seems to be a part of the conflict. The fracture 
emerged within the health care system, forcing medical workers to define their position:  either 
to be loyal to the ideals of the profession and to be on one wave of Ukrainian civil society, or to 
be adherent to the administrative and political regime and its leaders. This conflict between the 
state system and protesters to a large extent has excluded important resources of public health 
care with respect to the incident management system of the Euromaidan. It has not only led to 
underuse of public resources in care provision for protesters, but also violated the Constitution 
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which guarantees public medical care to all citizens (in additional traditional violence of the norm 
of free-of-charge medical care).  
Also, the Euromaidan is a means for political mobility. For example, some medical 
organizations of the Euromaidan have been established on behalf of political parties, including 
the Medychna Sluzhba and several medical points as mentioned above. Therefore, involvement in 
the coordination of the medical system of the Euromaidan resulted for some leaders in a 
promotion, or “political upward lift.” For instance, it allowed Dr. Oleh Musiy, one of the 
coordinators of the Medychna Sluzhba, to be appointed as the Minister of Health. Dr. Olga 
Bohomolets, having increased her reputation at the Euromaidan, had also been considered as a 
candidate for a Ministerial position and later participated in the Presidential elections. However, 
further activities of “medical doctors of Maidan” in the political field seem to be assessed by the 
public as rather questionable.   
The key issue of the organization of medical care at the Euromaidan is its coordination. The 
main challenge for the ‘health care system’ of the Maidan is not to provide enough resources 
(medications, doctors, money, expertise), but rather to allocate the right resources for the right 
patients in the right time. In particular, certain health care was asked for and was provided the 
next day; however, it was delivered in excessive amount in one medical point while other medical 
points were still lacking the necessary goods (as described in the results section).  
Considering the variety of organizations which provided care at the Euromaidan, a lack of 
coordination between them can be described as having the nature of ‘resolution of 
interdependencies between the activities of different organizational units’ (March & Simon 1958; 
Mintzberg 1979 in Smith & Dowell, 2000). The Medychna Sluzhba, positioning itself as a central 
body of medical services provision, is rather one of the organizations of the same kind 
(collecting medications, organizing volunteers and providing care). All in all, it is focused on 
‘coordination for itself’ rather than providing coordination to other medical care parties.     
Speaking about coordination, it is worth mentioning the importance of social capital on the 
Euromaidan. People with a wide network of personal, professional, and other connections are 
invaluable for the involvement of important resources (skilled doctors, ‘safe’ hospitals, rare or 
expensive medications) and the organization of care (transportation or treatment abroad). All 
types of connections, reinforced with the use of social media, played an extremely important 
role, especially when difficult-to-obtain goods (specific medical goods) were required for urgent 
situations.   
We would question the statement of the Minister of Health about widening the model of 
medical care of the Euromaidan to the health care system of the whole country. Appealing 
rhetoric about enthusiasm, mutual support, and self-organization should not drive the discussion 
away from the issues of inefficiency and lack of coordination. The latter two, being in the 
shadow during times of extreme events, are vital for medical care in regular peacetime 
conditions. It is extreme situations that have been a core for the model of medical care provision 
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at the Maidan. Our explorative case study reveals that during short periods of calm and stability, 
the Maidan’s “medical system” started to show signs of entropy. There were periods when 
quarrels, disagreements, and the abuse of resources were observed.     
The Euromaidan medical care initiatives should be seen not through the angle of a firm 
structure of services provision, like a healthcare system at peacetime, but rather from the 
perspective of an ever-evolving organism with weak vertical and strong horizontal connections.  
To summarize, the experience of the unique medical care provision system of the 
Euromaidan should be carefully studied, but not overestimated. On the one hand, no one knows 
how many lives would be lost if there had not been medical services available during the protest. 
However, we can only infer how many lives could be saved if medical care is more coordinated, 
efficient, and politically neutral. One thing is under no doubt – this experience is invaluable 
regarding the organization of disaster management, and it deserves further exploration with 
special attention to such issues as coordination as well as social capital investment and its 
coordination.    
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